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The decisions of the South Carolina Supreme Court in the
field of Torts during the period of this review contain several
which are of particular significance, in addition to the usual
run of routine appeals because of dissatisfaction with rulings
on evidence sufficient to support verdicts. Of the South Caro-
lina cases decided by the U. S. Court of Appeals during this
period, 'none is particularly significant.
Prenatal Injuries
In the case of West v. McCoy' the Supreme Court had pre-
sented to it for the first time the question of whether a cause
of action exists for the wrongful death of an unborn child.
The plaintiff alleged that she had suffered a miscarriage
about one month after a collision between defendant's auto
and hers. She alleged that she was 41/2 months pregnant at
the time of the accident, had felt the baby's movements some-
time prior to the accident and subsequent thereto, but about
two weeks after the accident complications arose which ulti-
mately led to the miscarriage.
The overruling of defendant's demurrer was reversed and
the demurrer sustained. The Court recognized the rapid
change which has taken place in the right of a child born
alive to maintain an action for prenatal injuries. The ma-
jority of the states now permit such actions while prior to
1949 the contrary was true.2 Nevertheless, only two cases
appear to have permitted suit for wrongful death when the
child was born dead.3 In both of those the child was not only
viable, but the injuries were inflicted at the time of normal
birth; in fact they arose out of alleged negligence in the de-
livery of the babies. In the principal case, the Court pointed
out that the child was not only born dead, but that it did not
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 233 S. C. 369, 105 S. E. 2d 88 (1958).
2. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 174 (2 ed. 1955); See THORNTON & MC-
NErc, TORTS, 31 N. Y. U. L. Rgv. 344, 459 (1956); also, RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 869 (1939).
3. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N. W. 2d 838 (1949);
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appear that it was viable at the time of the injury. It spe-
cifically reserved opinion on the right of a child born alive
to recover for prenatal injuries. At the pace other jurisdic-
tions have abandoned the lead of the Massachusetts decision
by Justice Holmes in 1884, saying that the unborn child was
a part of its mother, and therefore denying a right of action,
it is hard to believe that South Carolina will not follow the
modern trend to permit such a suit. As the Supreme Court
well said, "The policy considerations which call for a right
of action when a child survives do not necessarily apply in
the absence of survival."
Wrongful Death Act
In Rushton v. Smith4 the Supreme Court held that when
one class of statutory beneficiaries died before commence-
ment of a wrongful death suit, the right of action reverts to
the next statutory class instead of passing to the estate of
the first beneficiaries. Acknowledging that the majority view
is contra, the Court nevertheless concluded that it would not
overrule two earlier South Carolina cases5 which had declared
the above rule. In the principal case the plaintiff's intestate
died from injuries suffered in an automobile accident while
riding with her husband and allegedly caused by his negli-
gence. The husband survived by a few minutes and then died
leaving no children. This suit was instituted by the wife's ad-
ministrator for the benefit of her parents against the hus-
band's estate. The defendant's answer included allegations
that the only persons who could maintain the action were the
heirs at law of the defendant's estate and therefore any neg-
ligence for which he would have been liable would automatic-
ally bar their recovery. Plaintiff's motion to strike these al-
legations from the defendant's answer was granted.
The appellants tried in vain to persuade the Court that the
earlier Morris" case should be confined to a holding that the
death of the preferred beneficiary did not abate the action. It
happened that the persons in the next statutory class in the
Morris case were also the heirs at law, and the defendants ar-
gued that it was as much because they were heirs at law, as
4. 233 S. 0. 292, 104 S. E. 2d 376 (1958).
5. Morris v. Spartanburg Ry., Gas & Electric Co., 70 S. C. 279, 49
S. E. 854 (1904); Elkin v. Southern Ry., 156 S. C. 390, 153 S. E. 337
(1930).
6. 70 S. C. 279, 49 S. E. 854 (1904).
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because they were of another statutory class, that the Court
upheld the action in that case. However, the Court decided,
without giving its reasons why, to adhere to the rule pre-
viously announced.
Building Contractor's Liability to Third Parties
Clyde v. Sumerel7 involved an appeal by the Fiske-Carter
Construction Company, a building contractor, against whom,
along with the named defendant, the plaintiff obtained a $15,-
000 judgment for the death of her eight year old son. The
jury apportioned the damages at $7,500 against each defend-
ant and only the construction company appealed.
Appellant had constructed a shopping center for the owner
of certain premises who had leased to Sumerel one of the
stores for the operation of a drug store. After Sumerel had
taken possession, two display counters were delivered to him
and put on the ground outside the back of the store. A few
days later they were moved approximately 10 feet and put
on a bank or incline so that the area could be paved by a sub-
contractor. Who actually moved the counters was in dispute
between the defendants, with each contending the other did
so. In any event, plaintiff's decedent was found dead under
one of the heavy counters about 3 weeks later, having been
seen playing on the counters the day before. Appellant had
completed all work on the premises 13 days before the acci-
dent but it was 3 days before formal acceptance by the owner.
The case was tried upon the theory that the defendants had
created an attractive nuisance.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the judgment below,
stating that appellant had completed his work before the ac-
cident and that the date of the owner's formal acceptance was
not controlling in applying the general rule that a contractor
is not liable to third persons for injuries resulting from his
"negligent construction of the work" after completion and
actual acceptance by the owner.
Assuming that the evidence supported the jury's verdict
(and the Supreme Court did not discuss this because it de-
cided the rule stated above was controlling) it would seem
that appellant's liability should be judged on the same basis
as any other negligence case: defendant having created an
unreasonable risk of harm to others, he had a duty to correct
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it or protect others from it. When it is recognized that the
rule relieving a contractor from liability has its roots in the
doctrine that there must be privity of contract between the
parties to support an action for tort, it should not be con-
sidered apart from the rapid erosion of that doctrine begin-
ning with the famous case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.8
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1946 said of it, "The
MacPherson case caused the exception to swallow the asserted
general rule of non-liability, leaving nothing upon which that
rule could operate."' 9
In Foley v. Pittsburgh - DesMoines Co.,10 the MacPherson
rule was applied to the defendant contractor who had built a
large tank for the storage of liquefied natural gas which ex-
ploded 13 months after its completion because of negligence in
its construction. In response to the defendant's argument that
the rule should not apply because the tanks were a part of
the realty, the Court said:
... There is no logical basis for such a distinction, and
it would obviously be absurd to hold that a manufacturer
would be liable if negligent in building a small, readily
movable tank which would undoubtedly be a chattel, but
not in building an enormously large and correspondingly
more potentially dangerous a one that legalistically was
classified as realty. The principle inherent in the Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co. case and those that have fol-
lowed it is that one who manufactures and delivers any
article or structure with the knowledge that it will be
subjected to use by others, must, for the protection of
human life and property, use proper care to make it
reasonably safe for such users and for those who may
come into its vicinity; certainly the application of that
principle cannot be made to depend upon the merely tech-
nical distinction between a chattel and a structure built
upon the land .... 1
The Restatement of Torts, 1934 edition, recognized the lia-
bility of a contractor after acceptance of the work by the
owner in the following language:
8. 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
9. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N. E. 2d 693 (1946).
10. 363 Pa. 1, 68 A. 2d 517 (1949).
11. Id. at 533.
1959]
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§ 385 One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects
a structure or creates any other condition thereon is sub-
ject to liability to others within or without the land for
bodily harm caused to them by the dangerous character
of the structure or condition after his work has been ac-
cepted by the possessor under the same rules as those...
determining the liability of one who as a manufacturer
or independent contractor makes a chattel for the use of
others.
c. When work accepted by possessor. The liability
stated in this Section is imposed upon the servant or
contractor as the erector or creator of the structure or
condition and not as a person entitled to be upon the
land for the purpose of doing work with the consent and
on behalf of the possessor. When the work is completed
and accepted by the possessor the servant's or contrac-
tor's connection with the land ceases, just as a repair-
man loses possession of a chattel, which is entrusted to
him for repair, when he returns it to its owner. In both
cases, the liability is not subject to the same limitations
as is that of the possessor of land or chattels. While in
both cases it extends only to persons who are lawfully
using or sharing in the use of the land or chattel with
the consent of its possessor, neither a negligent servant
or contractor, nor a negligent manufacturer or repair-
man is relieved from the liability by the fact that he does
not know of the dangerous condition of the land or chat-
tel and that the person injured thereby is a gratuitous
licensee and not one who enters the land or uses the chat-
tel for the business purposes of its lawful possessor. In
this particular, the liability of a servant or contractor
for bodily harm done after the work has been turned over
to the possessor of the land for whom it is done, differs
from that of a servant or contractor for harm done while
he is still upon the land and in charge of the work of
erecting a structure or otherwise changing the physical
condition of the land.
In the principal case the Court relied on Nichols v. Craven2
which involved a suit by a motorist who suffered damages
in a collision with another motorist at the approach to a new
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bridge which had been constructed by the defendant contrac-
tor. The alleged negligence on the part of the contractor was
his failure to provide suitable barricades and warnings for
the traffic on the highway. There was no alleged negligence
in the construction of the bridge or of any other work of the
defendant. The sole delict charged to defendant was his fail-
ure to maintain signs, barricades, etc., at the time of the ac-
cident.13 This was a case of nonfeasance not misfeasance;
thus, defendant's duty to act had to be proved by plaintiff.
This plaintiff undertook to do by showing that defendant's
contract with the Highway Department imposed such a duty
on him. The Court held that defendant's duty to maintain
barricades under the contract expired with acceptance of his
work by the Department and that acceptance in fact was suf-
ficient, rather than formal acceptance. There was no conten-
tion that defendant did his work in a negligent manner which
resulted in the necessity of using the barricades. They were
required to direct traffic so that the traffic could be main-
tained while the new bridge was under construction. If there
was any negligence in the erection of the barricades by de-
fendant, it was superseded by the subsequent movement of
them by the Highway Department.14 The accident arose out
of the negligence of the Highway Department in its handling
of the barricades, not from defendant's failure to provide
them. This case can be distinguished from the principal case
because the alleged negligence of the defendant contractor in
the latter was his action by which he created a dangerous con-
dition: placing the display counter on the inclined bank in
such a way that it would overturn on a child - misfeasance
rather than nonfeasance. The negligent act of the contractor
placed the duty on him to correct it or be liable to one dam-
aged thereby.' 5 The duty was imposed on him by operation of
law irrespective of the contractual relationship; but even so,
the existence of the contractual relationship would not relieve
him of tort liability.' 6
13. "Therefore this appeal revolves around the question of who was
responsible for the failure to safeguard the traveling public .... " 224
S. C. 244, 78 S. E. 2d 376 (1953).
14. " . . . The barricades being moved from one road to the other
from time to time by the Highway Department as it facilitated the
paving program." Id. at 251.
15. Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q. B. D. 503 (1883); PRossER, LAw Op TORTS
183 (2d ed. 1955).
16. "On the other hand, where the contract creates a certain relation-
ship between the parties, and certain duties arise by operation of law,
1959]
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Furthermore, the A.L.R. annotation which the Court cited
for the general rule of nonliability includes the following
language: "The trend of judicial decisions has, as in the case
of the liability of a manufacturer of articles for negligence
to third persons, revealed a gradual limitation of the rule of
nonliability of the construction contractor by the ingrafting of
limitations or exceptions upon the rule. The notion that no
duty, other than a contractual duty owing solely to the con-
tractee, rests upon the contractor, has been at times subjected
to severe attack by the courts, and has resulted in certain ex-
ceptions to the rule, predicated on the imminency or inherency
of the danger involved in the defective construction of the
project, the likelihood that it will result in injury to persons
coming in contact therewith, the knowledge of the contractor
of the danger involved or the doctrine of implied invitation
and of maintenance of a nuisance."'17
Thus we find less and less law and no apparent reason for
a rule that insulates a contractor from liability to those in-
jured as a result of his negligence in performing his under-
takings.
Interference With Right of Attachment
In Stewart v. Martin8 plaintiff's attempt to attach a third
party's automobile which collided with plaintiff's automobile
led to a suit by plaintiff against the defendant finance com-
pany for secreting the offending automobile, on which it held
a mortgage, to avoid the attachment. The trial court had
treated the case as a cause of action for conversion and sus-
tained the defendant's demurrer that no such action could be
maintained because the plaintiff had no lien on the car until
there had been a judicial determination to that effect. The
Supreme Court reversed and said it did not construe the com-
plaint as an action for conversion but rather as "an action to
recover damages resulting from the wrongful and malicious
irrespective of the contract, because of this relationship, then the breach
of such duties warrants an action in tort. As was said in one of the eases
cited by counsel, to wit, St. Charles Merc. Co. v. Armour & Co., 156 S. C.
397, 153 S. E. 473, 477 (1929), 'Actions in tort often have their be-
ginning in contractual matters.' Meddlin v. Southern Ry., 218 S. C. 155,
165, 62 S. E. 2d 109 (1950).
17. 13 A. L. R. 2d 233 (1951).
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act of the defendants in removing and secreting said Chevro-
let automobile and thereby preventing the sheriff from seiz-
ing same under the attachment in its hands."'"
In answer to the defendant's argument that it could not be
determined whether plaintiff had suffered any damages until a
judicial determination of plaintiff's rights against the offend-
ing automobile could be had, the Court answered:
But we do not think the recovery of a judgment in the
other action is a prerequisite to bringing this action,
which is entirely distinct from an action for damages
against the offending car or its driver.
20
In the opinion the Court went on to approve its earlier
cases holding that the plaintiff's lien against the automobile
arises at the time of the accident and is independent of the
attachment of the automobile. 21 This raises the very impor-
tant question of what is the wrong which the defendant is al-
leged to have committed? The defendant also, as the mortga-
gee, had a very substantial interest in the automobile which
he secreted. He has done nothing to prevent the lien nor to ex-
tinguish it. The Court said this was not an action for conver-
sion, i.e., the exercise of unlawful dominion over the property.
There was no allegation that defendant had damaged or de-
stroyed the property. If the cause of action is to protect the
plaintiff's right to conserve the property under lien by having
it taken into custody by the sheriff, it appears that plaintiff
could not be damaged until it could be shown that plaintiff
obtained a judgment and had failed in his efforts to collect it.
Since the Court said a judgment against the offending automo-
bile or driver was not essential to maintain the action, it must
have had in mind protecting some other right of the plaintiff.
This appears to lead to the conclusion that it was undertak-
ing to vindicate plaintiff's right to have his attachment with-
out interference by defendant or anyone else, regardless of
any property damage which he may have suffered. Thus it is
likened to an action for trespass where the law presumes
19. Id. at 887.
20. Id. at 889.
21. Waldrop v. M. & J. Finance Corporation, 178 S. C. 527, 183 S. E.
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plaintiff's damages as the result of defendant's wrongful con-
duct and nominal damages are sufficient to support a verdict
for punitive damages in such situations.
22
If the above analysis of the case is correct, plaintiff could
have his action against the defendant even after plaintiff's
suit had resulted in a judgment for the car or driver; like-
wise plaintiff could maintain the action even if plaintiff re-
ceived a judgment against the driver and it was paid from
other assets.
The fact that the Court quoted from C.J.S. ("one who im-
pedes or obstructs another's remedy for enforcement of a
fixed and ascertained right against a third person has been
held responsible for the injury thus occasioned") 23 supports
the conclusion that the injury it had in mind was the inter-
ference with plaintiff's right to have his legal process served.
This is somewhat reinforced by the fact that the South Caro-
lina case cited by C.J.S. as the only authority for the quota-
tion24 involved conversion, which the Court had stated was
not involved in this case. In other words, the Court appears
to have adopted the proposition stated in the text without hav-
ing it limited by the facts of the case cited.
Unfortunately no reference was made to any of the cases
involving suits for obstructing a process server. It has been
held that a plaintiff cannot maintain a suit against a person
for assisting one to escape a process server without a show-
ing of damages proximately caused.25 In the 1812 South Caro-
lina case of Seehorn v. Darwin,26 it was held that plaintiff
could not maintain an action against the defendant who had
assisted in the escape of a debtor (defendant's son) after he
had been taken into custody under a capias ad satisfaciendum.
This case would seem to be analagous to the principal case in
that plaintiff sought recovery against a third party who had
22. PRossER, LAW Or TORTS 27 (2d ed. 1955); Jones v. A. G. L. Rail-
road Co., 108 S. C. 217, 94 S. E. 490 (1917). "If the defendant received
and disposed of the cotton mentioned in the complaint, having actual
notice of the plaintiff's prior lien for rent, then he became liable, not
for the value of the cotton or its proceeds, but for the damages which
the Plaintiff sustained by reason of the impairment of the security
which the plaintiff had for enforcing payment of his lien for rent."
[Emphasis added.] Graham v. Seignious, 53 S. C. 132, 137, 31 S. E.
51 (1897).
23. Stewart v. Martin, 232 S. C. 483, 102 S. E. 2d 886, 888 (1958).
24. Michalson v. All, 43 S. C. 459, 21 S. E. 323 (1895).
2 5. Waggener v. Harding, 79 Colo. 214, 244 P. 908 (1926).
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interfered with the plaintiff's security for a debt. The signifi-
cant difference was that the sheriff had the security in cus-
tody in that case, whereas in the principal case he was pre-
vented from taking the security into custody. However, in
the Seehorn case 27 the plaintiff still had a remedy against the
sheriff, which he did not have in the principal case.
The Court offered as one reason for its conclusion the fact
that a plaintiff, seeking to bring an action in rem against the
car alone, would be completely thwarted by conduct such as de-
fendant's. But it was not so alleged in this case, nor did the
Court state that such a limitation should be applied to the
Application of this rule. Nor was it pointed out the the con-
duct of defendant must be willful and done with knowledge
of the plaintiff's claim against the car. Is this limitation im-
plicit in the decision? Does plaintiff have to make a demand
on defendant for the secreted automobile and have it refused
before he can maintain the action? Would defendant's sur-
render of the car to the sheriff anytime before judgment
abate the action?
There seems to be no reason why a defendant acting de-
liberately to thwart another's use of legal process available to
that other, should not be answerable to him in damages, ac-
tual and punitive, and such arguments as used in the Seehorn
case: "I have never read or heard of such an action; ... there
is no privity of contract between the parties... ,'28 have lost
their forcefulness in the modern law of torts. The only ques-
tions should be, has plaintiff suffered an interference with
his legal right? Has the defendant acted intentionally to bring
this about? The wrong should be clearly identified as the
interference with the legal process and not dependent upon
a special property interest in the nature of an inchoate lien.
There would seem to be no necessity to require plaintiff to
make a demand on defendant, because defendant may have
succeeded in concealing that he had secreted the automobile
until after it was determined that the driver of the automo-
bile was not liable to plaintiff which would thereby extinguish
plaintiff's right to demand the automobile.
No doubt this case will precipitate further litigation on
this subject.
27. Ibid.
28. Id. at 282, 283.
1959]
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Conversion
In the case of Caroll v. M. & J. Finance Corp.29 the plain-
tiff's judgment for defendant's conversion of plaintiff's
wrecked automobile was reversed and judgment entered for
defendant. The Court held that there was no evidence of de-
fendant's having done anything to interfere with plaintiff's
possession of the automobile even though defendant had
advertised it for sale erroneously thinking plaintiff was in
arrears on her mortgage payments to defendant for the auto-
mobile. The sale was cancelled and defendant made no effort
to move the automobile nor to prevent plaintiff from moving
it from the garage to which plaintiff had had it towed. In
the absence of some evidence showing that defendant had as-
sumed actual control of the property there was a lack of the
essential taking of dominion over the property to the exclus-
ion of plaintiff's rights.
Slander
A Supermarket manager's question to a customer at the
cash register, "Have you paid for that coffee you have got in
your bag?", was held not to be a charge that the customer
(plaintiff) was guilty of larceny. In Drakeford v. Dixie Home
Stores,30 plaintiff had gone into defendant's store with a jar
of coffee visible in her open handbag hanging from her shoul-
der. When the manager asked her the question, she explained
that she had brought the coffee into the store whereupon he
left and went to the back of the store. The fact that plaintiff
herself then said to the cashier, "He has deliberately charged
me with stealing this coffee," was held to have added noth-
ing to the defendant's conduct. The Court found error in the
trial court's having stated in its order: "As a matter of law
the question of the manager was as to a matter of concern
to both plaintiff and himself and therefore privileged."3'
Holding that the issue of privilege is a matter of defense not
for determination on demurrer, the Court nevertheless af-
firmed the sustaining of the demurrer on the ground that it
failed to state a cause of action.
29. 233 S. C. 200, 104 S. E. 2d 171 (1958).
30. 233 S. C. 519, 105 S. E. 2d 711 (1958).
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Libel
In Rogers v. Florence Printing Co.,32 the defendant's at-
tack on the soundness of the doctrine of punitive damages
was to no avail. Plaintiff's judgment for $20,000 punitive and
$5,000 actual damages for a libellous article in defendant's
newspaper was affirmed. Although the Court acknowledged
that many have contended that punitive damages have no
place in civil suits, that such punishment is for the criminal
courts, it found that this state has operated under the policy
of permitting punitive damages for torts not alone as pun-
ishment of defendant, but as a vindication of private rights.
Defendant's argument that the maximum fine of $5,000 pro-
vided for one guilty of criminal libel should operate as a limit
to the amount of punitive damages did not impress the Court.
Defendant's contention that the prejudice of the jury was
reflected in its assessment of punitive damages, in spite of
plaintiff's failure to prove the wealth of the defendant, was
answered by the Court by reaffirming the rule declared in
Charles v. Texas Company,33 that the proof of defendant's
financial worth is not a prerequisite to punitive damages al-
though it may be considered by the jury, despite defendant's
argument that a defendant should not be compelled to prove
his poverty at his peril.
Without implying the slightest disagreement with the
soundness of the conclusion reached in this case, it is hoped
that the Court will not attempt to live too literally by its
statement that public policy once established by the Courts
should not be changed except by legislation. As the New York
Court of Appeals had occasion recently to point out, the com-
mon law is not static; the obligation of the courts to change
an existing rule of law should not always be shunted off to
the legislatures:
Of course, rules of law on which men rely in their busi-
ness dealings should not be changed in the middle of the
game, but what has that to'do with bringing to justice
a tortfeasor who surely has no moral or other right to
rely on a decision of the New York Court of Appeals?
Negligence Law is common law, and the common law has
been molded and changed and brought up-to-date in
many another case. Our court said, long ago, that it had
32. 233 S. C. 567, 106 S. E. 2d 258 (1958).
33. 199 S. C. 156, 18 S. E. 2d 719 (1942).
1959]
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not only the right, but the duty to re-examine a question
where justice demands it. [Citations omitted.] ....
And Justice Sutherland, writing for the Supreme Court
in Funk v. United States (290 U.S. 371, 382, 54 S. Ct.
212, 215, 78 L. Ed. 369), said that while legislative bodies
have the power to change old rules of law, nevertheless,
when they fail to act, it is the duty of the court to bring
the law into accordance with present day standards of
wisdom and justice rather than "with some outworn and
antiquated rule of the past." ....
We act in the finest common-law tradition when we adapt
and alter decisional law to produce common-sense jus-
tice.
The same answer goes to the argument that the change
we here propose should come from the Legislature, not
the courts. Legislative action there could, of course, be,
but we abdicate our own function, in a field peculiarly
non statutory, when we refuse to reconsider an old and
unsatisfactory court made rule.
3 4
In Timmons v. News and Press,35 the Supreme Court re-
versed the trial court's sustaining of a demurrer to plaintiff's
complaint alleging that plaintiff's store was identified as
the source from which a plague of town drunks were obtain-
ing a bay rum shaving lotion. The article proceeded at some
length to detail the fact that plaintiff's store was reputed to
sell enough of the lotion to provide for over 1400 binges per
week; that the police were confronted with a problem since
the sales were not illegal; and that the savings, which were
considerable as compared to the cost of liquor, could be ap-
plied toward the payments of fines for drunkenness after the
purchaser became drunk. There was no doubt as to the iden-
tity of plaintiff's place of business because the newspaper
34. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349, 102 N. E. 2d 691, 694 (1951);
"We are of the opinion there is no justification for absolute immunity
[of a charitable corporation] if the trust is protected, because that has
been the reason for the rule of absolute immunity. Reason and justice
require an extension of the rule in an attempt to inject some humani-
tarian principles into the abstract rule of absolute immunity. The law
is not static and must follow and conform to changing conditions and
new trends in human relations to justify its existence as a servant and
protector of the people and, when necessary, new remedies must be ap-
plied where none exist." Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. 2d 81, 86
(1950).
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story included a photograph. Without specifying the particu-
lar allegations which it found to be defamatory, the Supreme
Court held them to be sufficient.
The opinion does not serve as much of a guide for the trial
court because it does not differentiate the allegations of fact
from the legal conclusions of the pleader, nor point specific-
ally to errors in the trial judge's conclusions that the defa-
mation, if any, was of the plaintiff's customers and not the
plaintiff. There was no accusation that plaintiff was doing
anything illegal in selling the lotion, although it was implied
that his refusal to sell it for internal consumption would help
alleviate the situation. Is the defamation to be found in the
allegation that plaintiff sold the lotion for internal consump-
tion? Or that he sold it in large quantities? Or that he had a
lot of customers who were habitual drunkards? Or a combina-
tion of all these facts? If there is no allegation that one has
cultivated habitual drunkards, it would seem difficult to find
defamation in the mere fact that they are regular customers
of the plaintiff. Perhaps the Court was most impressed with
the item in the newspaper that another merchant stopped
selling the product for known use as a beverage thereby im-
plying that plaintiff's failure to do the same was an indirect
way of cultivating associations with the habitual drunkards,
but it did not make this clear.
Fraud
In Mishoe v. Generai Motors Acceptance Corporation3
plaintiff's judgment against defendant for fraud and deceit
in the repossession of an automobile, on which an installment
was four days overdue, was reversed for entry of a judgment
for defendant. Defendant's agent had called on plaintiff four
days after an annual installment of $600 was due, and when
plaintiff asked how much the payment including overdue in-
terest would be, the agent said he didn't know, for plaintiff
to go to Tabor City with him and they would get it straight-
ened out. When they were at the dealer's in Tabor City from
whom plaintiff had purchased the auto, defendant's agent
took possession of the automobile and said plaintiff could re-
gain possession only by paying that day the full balance due
36. 234 S. C. 182, 107 S. E. 2d 43 (1958).
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on the car: the $600 plus the next annual and final install-
ment of $833.99. Since plaintiff did not pay the balance, de-
fendant later sold the car at public auction for $1000. The
fraud charged by plaintiff was that defendant's agent had in-
vited him to go to Tabor City representing the purpose to be
to calculate the interest on the one installment overdue while
it was his secret purpose to take possession of the automobile
and demand the full payment of the indebtedness. The dam-
age alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff was the loss
of possession of his automobile.
The Supreme Court recited the pertinent terms of the con-
ditional sales contract which gave defendant the right to ac-
celerate the due date of the entire balance if plaintiff de-
faulted on any installment as well as the right to immediate
possession of the automobile. Holding that defendant had
acted within its rights in taking peaceable possession of the
automobile, as well as in having demanded payment of the full
balance for its release, the Court found no basis for an action
in fraud. It pointed to the fact that plaintiff was present at
the sale of the automobile at public auction and made no ef-
fort to protect his equity of redemption by paying the debt
owed or attempting to purchase the car at auction. It found no
damage suffered by plaintiff.
Negligent Maintenance of Equipment
In Brown v. National Oil Company,37 the jury's willingness
to let the negligent truck driver of defendant oil company go
without liability raised the question of whether the verdict
for the plaintiff could be supported by other evidence of negli-
gence on the part of the Company besides that of the truck
driver. Plaintiff's filling station and general store had burned
down as a result of a fire which began when a third party lit a
cigarette near defendant's unloading oil tank truck. The Court
found sufficient evidence of negligence on the Company's part
in not properly venting the gasoline pumps which it had sup-
plied and maintained. The Court, concluding that the con-
scious act of the third party which set off the initial explosion
was not the efficient operating cause of plaintiff's loss be-
cause it was foreseeable that customers would be smoking in
the area, and that the accumulation of gasoline vapors which




Published by Scholar Commons,
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
were ignited resulted from the negligent installation and
maintenance of the pumps, reversed the judgment for defend-
ant n.o.v.
In Elliott v. Black River Electric Cooperative," the plain-
tiff's judgment for $106,100 actual and $5,000 punitive dam-
ages was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Plaintiff's husband
was killed while replacing a 21-foot section of the lift rod to
his water pump which came into contact with defendant's
overhead high voltage line while the decedent was withdraw-
ing it from the well.
The Court found that defendant knew, or should have
known, that this length of lift rod was standard in the area
and that it was customary to remove them from the wells from
time to time, thus defendant owed a duty to locate its high
voltage lines so that they would not pass directly over the
wells, or to give warning to those in decedent's position of the
dangers inherent in the high voltage lines. Calling attention
to the high duty of care owed by those handling electricity the
Court said:
The care thus required of power companies means
more than mechanical skill. It includes foresight with re-
gard to reasonably probable contingencies. 9
In reviewing the size of the verdict which defendant com-
plained was so excessive as to be manifestly the result of
passion and prejudice, the Court observed:
The growing tendency in recent years toward verdicts in
death cases which, although not manifestly the result of
passion, prejudice or other improper motive, are never-
theless so large as to indicate, even in an inflated econ-
omy undue liberality on the part of the jury, has given
this court much concern; but we have no power to re-
duce such verdicts. If relief from them is to be provided,
it must come from: (1) the juries themselves... (2) the
trial judges... (3) the General Assembly... 4 o
If the dollar continues its steady decline in purchasing
power for the next twenty years at the same pace it has for
the past twenty years, it's doubtful that the verdict should be
considered excessive for the death of a man 51 years old, in
38. 233 S. C. 233, 104 S. E. 2d 357 (1958).
39. Id. at 368.
40. Id. at 374.
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sound health with an annual income of about $6,800 and a
life expectancy of 21 years leaving a widow and seven child-
ren.
Emotional Distress Causing Physical Harm Without Impact
Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distributing Co.,41 affirmed
the liability of the defendant for plaintiff's physical damages
resulting from the emotional shock of having defendant's
liquor truck run into the living room of plaintiff's home but
without hitting plaintiff.
Many courts require that plaintiff show that he was put in
fear of physical harm to his person before recovery will be
permitted in cases where no impact has been suffered even
when there has been physical damage resulting from the mo -
tional stress negligently caused by defendant.42 In the princi-
pal case the report does not make it clear whether the plain-
tiff was placed in fear of harm to himself or not, although it
may be a reasonable inference from the fact that he was in the
sitting room looking at television when he heard a terrible
noise and felt the jarring of the house as the truck crashed into
the front of it. To illustrate the point, would defendant also be
liable to plaintiff's wife if she had watched from across the
highway and suffered paralysis as a result of her fear for her
family's safety? Nothing in the case would seem to prevent
such a recovery. And what about the neighbor who also was
watching and suffered a severe case of the hives resulting
therefrom? The early South Carolina case of MacIc v. South
Bound R. Co.,48 which permitted recovery by an infant of
tender years who had enough presence of mind to crouch
down between the tracks when defendant's negligently oper-
ated train passed over him, did not discuss the need for fear of
physical harm to the plaintiff, but it was clearly apparent from
the facts that plaintiff was put in fear of harm to himself. The
present case is not so clearcut and leaves the door open for
further inquiry.
41. 232 1S. C. 593, 103 S. E. 2d 265 (1958).
42. PRoSSER, LAW OF TORTS 181 (2d ed. 1955); Wambe v. Warrington,
216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W. 497 (1935)
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Liability of Occupant of Land to Persons Entering Thereon
In Baker v. Clark,44 a directed verdict for the defendant
department store owner was affirmed by the Supreme Court
on the grounds that the plaintiff had assumed the risk or was
at least contributorily negligent. Plaintiff, who was an occa-
sional customer, was injured when she slipped down on de-
fendant's floor which had just been polished and about which
she had just been warned by defendant's clerk who had given
plaintiff permission to use a toilet reserved for employees.
Although there was conflict in the testimony as to exactly
what the warning was, there was no denial of the fact that
she was warned. The Court thus found it unnecessary to de-
termine whether she was an invitee or licensee, holding that
the duty to an invitee would be no more than to warn her.
Bowling v. Lewis45 also involved the duty of the occupant
of the premises to others coming on the premises. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
involuntary dismissal of plaintiff's action by the District
Judge, holding that the evidence presented a question for the
jury. Plaintiff, a guest in defendant's motel, was injured
when he fell over a large rock on defendant's private side-
walk leading to plaintiff's motel room from the parking space
to which he had been assigned. Plaintiff and his family had
gone from the motel about 7:15 p.m. without incident; upon
their return to the motel about two hours later, defendant
had turned off all outside lights which left the walkway so
dark that plaintiff remained in his automobile with the head-
lights on so that his wife and two small children could see to
get to the room. After extinguishing the automobile lights,
plaintiff walked on the same sidewalk to his room and tripped
over the rock which had fallen from a two-foot wall along-
side the sidewalk and built of loose coral rock without mortar.
When the manager was told of the accident, he said he didn't
know why the rocks had fallen out of the wall so much more
this year. The Court found sufficient evidence of negligence
in the fact that defendant knew that the rocks had been fall-
ing into the walk and the fact that defendant had cut all the
outside lights to save expense because this was during an off-
season and plaintiff was his only guest. Finding no South
Carolina cases involving the duty of an innkeeper to his guests,
44. 233 S. C. 20, 103 S. E. 2d 395 (1958).
45. 261 F. 2d 311 (4th Cir. 1958).
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the Court concluded it would certainly be no less than that
owed by a merchant to a prospective customer: reasonable
care to make the premises reasonably safe.
Manufacturer's Liability to Third Persons
In Ford Motor Company v. McDavid,46 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the judg-
ment for plaintiff on the grounds that a verdict should have
been directed for defendant. Plaintiff was injured when rid-
ing as a passenger in his wife's automobile purchased from
a dealer of the defendant. The automobile had been driven
only 2600 miles when a front tire blew out because of exces-
sive wear due to the misalignment of the front wheels. The
Court found that the evidence of the misalignment having
originated at defendant's factory was insufficient because it
was undisputed that the dealer had replaced the power steer-
ing with which the car was equipped at the factory and that
in so doing the alignment of the wheels would necessarily be
involved. Furthermore, the automobile had been inspected
several times by widely separated dealers, none of whom had
noted any misalignment even though the car had been driven
far enough before the last inspection that excessive wear on
the tires would have been obvious to the most casual inspec-
tion. In a footnote discussing the dearth of South Carolina
law relating to the tort liability of a manufacturer to a re-
mote vendee for a product negligently made the Court con-
cluded:
In the light of what it has said, and at this late date,
we would be wholly unrealistic if we assumed that the
Supreme Court of South Carolina would now apply the
unduly restrictive and long discredited limitation which
recognizes no obligation of a manufacturer except to
those in privity of contract with him claiming under a
breach of warranty. See Pierce v. Ford Motor Co. 4 Cir.,
190 F. 2d 910.
47
Automobile Collisions
In Smith v. Lynch,48 plaintiff's verdict for $45,000 actual
and $500 punitive damages was affirmed by the Supreme
46. 259 F. 2d 261 (4th Cir. 1958).
47. Id. at 265, f. n. 3.
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Court. Defendant's intestate had driven through an inter-
section of two U.S. highways without stopping, as she was
required to do by the posted signs, and collided with plaintiff's
intestate who was travelling on the intersecting highway.
Plaintiff's intestate was killed instantly; defendant's intestate
died three days later. Eye witnesses testified that neither
automobile slowed down and that defendant's intestate had
stated after the accident that she didn't see the stop sign. The
Court held that plaintiff's intestate's contributory negligence
was a question for the jury.
In Green v. Boney,49 plaintiff's verdict for $12,500 actual
and $2000 punitive damages was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. Plaintiff and defendant were driving in opposite di-
rections on the highway in daylight under optimum weather
conditions. Plaintiff turned left to go to a small store when
defendant's automobile collided with plaintiff's after defend-
ant's skidded some 175 feet on the highway. Plaintiff was in
defendant's lane when he was hit. There was evidence to the
effect that defendant was driving at a very high rate of speed
just a few minutes before the accident, and the Court held
that the questions of negligence and contributory negligence
were for the jury. The fact of defendant's having plead
guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the death of plaintiff's
passenger who was killed instantly was no doubt very per-
suasive evidence.
That circumstantial evidence of negligence may overcome
tho testimony of a witness to the contrary is illustrated in
Shepherd v. U.S.F.&G. Co.,50 in which plaintiff was involved
in an auto accident with defendant's runaway auto. The last
driver of defendant's auto testified she had parked the car
in the carport with the parking brake set and with the auto-
matic drive in "park" position. About an hour later the auto-
mobile had rolled out of the driveway which declines sharply
to the street and collided with plaintiff in his automobile. At
that time the automatic shift lever was in "neutral" rather
than "park" and the brakes were not set, nor was the window
up, as the driver had testified she had left them. The Court
found these facts ample evidence to support the jury's verdict
for the plaintiff, which was affirmed.
49. 233 S. C. 49, 103 S. E. 2d 733 (1958).
50. 233 S. C. 536, 106 S. E. 2d 381 (1958).
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In Spencer v. Kirby,51 in which plaintiff's intestate drove
his car into a highway from his driveway on the defendant's
right and crossed over to the defendant's left side of the road
to travel in the opposite direction to defendant and collided
head on with defendant who had swerved to the left in an
effort to avoid plaintiff's intestate, the Court held that the
question of negligence and contributory negligence was for
the jury. Chief Justice Stukes dissented on the grounds that
the evidence is susceptible of only one inference: that plain-
tiff's intestate entered the highway without stopping and
got in the path of defendant's vehicle. He argues that de-
cedent's violation of the statute requiring one entering the
highway to yield the right of way would be as much reckless-
ness as defendant's violation of the speed statute and would
therefore bar plaintiff's recovery.
This raises the question which has often occurred: since
the Supreme Court justices themselves disagreed as to what
inferences may be drawn from the evidence, is this not the
best evidence that the case should go to the jury on the
grounds that reasonable men may disagree as to the infer-
ences? Or, to state it another way, is it not inconsistent to
say that only one reasonable inference may be drawn from
the evidence, when members of the Supreme Court have them-
selves reached a different conclusion?
The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed
a judgment for the plaintiff in the case of Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co. v. DeLoach 2 in which the plaintiff suffered
damage to his Volkswagen automobile as well as personal
injuries when a state owned school bus turned suddenly to
the left while he was passing it on the highway. The defend-
ant contended that plaintiff's failure to sound his horn when
passing was a violation of the statute and therefore negli-
gence per se. The Court noted that the statute required sound-
ing of the overtaking automobile's horn only when reason-
ably necessary to insure safe operation of the vehicle and held
that the trial court was justified in concluding that there
were no circumstances to require plaintiff's use of his horn
in this case.
51. 234 S. 0. 59, 106 S. E. 2d 883 (1959).
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In Meek v. Harris,53 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in a per curiam, opinion held that testimony that de-
fendant had operated his automobile at speeds of 70 to 75
miles per hour and on the wrong side of the road was suffi-
cient evidence to meet the Guest Statute's requirements of
recklessness or heedlessness. Plaintiff's judgment was af-
firmed.
In Williams v. Ford,54 the Supreme Court affirmed the trial
judge's granting of judgment for the defendant n.o.v. Plain-
tiff's decedent was killed when struck by defendant's truck
on the highway. According to defendant's witnesses, plain-
tiff was struck when he staggered out into the highway
in front of defendant's truck just as it turned out to the
left to pass an automobile which turned off onto the right
shoulder to avoid plaintiff's decedent. Plaintiff's contention
was that the circumstantial evidence pointed to the decedent's
having been run down from behind while walking on the
shoulder of the highway facing oncoming traffic as the stat-
ute required. Defendant's truck driver's testimony was cor-
roborated by the driver of the automobile which had pulled
off on the right shoulder to avoid hitting decedent and by
the driver of another truck following behind defendant's
truck. Although the driver of the second truck was a friend
of defendant's driver, the automobile driver witness was a
stranger. Plaintiff had no eye witnesses and the Court held
that the uncontradicted testimony of defendant's witnesses
must prevail as against circumstantial evidence which was
inconsistent therewith.
53. 256 F. 2d 579 (4th Cir. 1958).
54. 233 S. C. 304, 104 S. E. 2d 378 (1958).
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